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We thank the authors for their commentary and humbly accept their chiding about our language on 
the ontological nature of themes. While noting that many qualitative researchers are content with 
talk of “themes emerging” (e.g., Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Rennie, 1996), we recognise 
Braun and Clarke’s concerns around such language (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and concur with their 
views on the role of the researcher in the analysis. Nonetheless, there is something in the data that 
underscores the researcher’s interpretation. The process is more complex than finding a diamond in 
the sand, it is not just about a theme emerging passively, yet that does not break the idea behind the 
approach we presented. Whatever you want to call the something that is in the data, and we could 
use “codes” (Braun & Clarke, 2006) or maybe “accounts” (Malterud, Siersma, & Guassora, 2015), 
that something can be conceptualised along the same lines. 
 
That something may or may not be present in a particular interview, some somethings will be more 
prevalent than others. If we want to capture more somethings and less common somethings, there 
are various approaches you can take. Morse (2000) and Malterud et al. (2015) discuss these, 
including varying your sampling strategy or how you perform the interviews, but they, and others 
(Tracy, 2010), agree that more participants is sometimes appropriate.  
 
To quote Malterud and colleagues (2015, p. 6), “The best qualitative analysis is conducted from 
empirical data containing abundant and various accounts of new aspects of the phenomenon we 
intend to explore […] The sample should be neither too small nor too large”. We concur. We should 
have said more about the “too large” and agree with Braun and Clarke’s observation that larger 
numbers can lead to less rigour in other ways, as has also been said of randomised controlled trials. 
But more is sometimes better. We also contend that our model does not point to “relatively large 
sample sizes”: our approach is consistent with the numbers in Braun and Clarke (2013). 
 
Where our approach differs from others is the addition of probability theory. Malterud et al. (2015 
p. 3) write “we might be fortunate and drop into a group of participants with a diversity of 
experiences. Hence, sample specificity cannot always be predicted but can be supported by suitable 
recruitment.” (2015, p. 3) Sampling indeed involves an element of chance. You do not know what 
someone is going to say before you talk to them. Research participants will have different 
experiences or perspectives: what you get in your sample “cannot always be predicted”. We all 
might be fortunate or unfortunate in our sampling. We can use maths to put likely bounds on those 
chances. We don’t believe an observation about numbers contradicts non-positivist approaches. 
 
Our intuitions can be wrong with probabilities. By giving a probabilistic formula, we aim to assist 
researchers’ thinking on sample sizes. Probability theory is a way of helping to achieve that goal of 
“abundant and various accounts”. We do not claim this element of thinking about sample size is 
  
more important than other factors discussed in Malterud et al. (2015), Morse (2000), Tracy (2010) 
etc. 
 
As per Reicher (2000), we view the contrast between quantitative and qualitative methods to be 
unhelpful, while acknowledging profound epistemological differences between positivism and other 
positions. We have repeatedly been described as positivists, but one of us (HP) identifies more with 
constructionism (e.g., Greenhalgh, Potts, Wong, Bark, & Swinglehurst, 2009). The other (AF) is 
hesitant about committing publicly to a particular -ism, but feels drawn to epistemological 
anarchism (Feyerabend, 1975). 
 
Our work is not a quant attack on qual. We intend it as a bridge, a piece of maths that helps us think 
about chance, because chance is part of qualitative research and qualitative sampling. If there is a 
random element, then why deny the value of probability? Chance is difficult to think about without 
a theory and probability theory is not a bad place to start. Qualitative researchers do not need to 
abandon their ethos to use maths. 
 
Let us end by quoting Reicher (2000, p. 2) again: “any critical comments that I make are understood 
as a contribution to the developing debate rather than an attempt to kill the debate at birth. Whatever 
disagreements I do have, they are secondary to my wish to see the widest and fullest discussion 
possible. For those within different traditions, to engage in that discussion would be a great step 
forward. Even if we end up disagreeing we may also come to understand our differences and 
recognize, perhaps even respect, the bases of such difference.” 
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